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SAFE DEPOSIT v. ROBERTSON
that legislation restricting the exercise of rights embraced
in the First Amendment should be regarded as presump-
tively invalid. What is really behind the notion sought to
be expressed by this phrase, he states, is merely that the
courts should feel more free than in other cases to find
legislation unconstitutional where "free inquiry" is in-
volved, since it is this which assures us of an "open
society as against a closed one"; while they should be less
willing to oppose their opinions to those of legislatures
in the economic area which is one of changing and debatable
views. Furthermore, he reasons, all means of communi-
cation are not given the same constitutional rights as the
unaided human voice, but raise new problems which were
not contemplated by the draftsmen of the Constitution and
which can be left to the legislative judgment for solution.
In the instant case one of the problems raised is that by
the use of sound trucks unwilling people can be forced to
listen, thus making further inroads on the "steadily nar-
rowing opportunities for serenity and reflection" which
are necessary to freedom of thought; "and without freedom
of thought there can be no free society".
FURTHER ON WHETHER A SPENDTHRIFT TRUST
MAY BE REACHED FOR ALIMONY OR SUPPORT
Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Robertson1
Appellee, wife, obtained a divorce a vinculo from her
husband in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City. The de-
cree ordered the husband to pay a certain sum as permanent
alimony, subject to the further order of the Court. Subse-
quently, the husband took up residence in New York and
allowed the alimony payments to fall in arrears. Appellee
obtained an order reducing to judgment the arrears in
the amount of $4,229 and laid an attachment for this
amount in the hands of the garnishee-appellant, who filed
a motion to quash, reciting that the only assets in its hands
consisted of accrued income payable to the husband under
valid spendthrift trusts. The Chancellor overruled the
motion to quash, and signed an order directing the gar-
nishee to bring into court all the funds due the judgment
debtor, and pay the same to him in open court on a certain
day, the husband being notified by registered mail to appear
165 A. 2d 292 (Md. 1949).
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on that day. He declined to do so. The Chancellor further
ordered that if the husband did not appear, the garnishee
should pay over the funds to the Clerk of Court "until all
of the arrears of alimony due by him.., be fully paid and
satisfied". An appeal was taken from that order, no question
being raised as to the validity of the judgment or attach-
ment from a procedural point of view.
Thus, the question was squarely presented to the Court
of Appeals as to whether the rule prohibiting attachment
of income from spendthrift trusts should apply to claims
for alimony. The Court, in a unanimous opinion written by
Judge Henderson, held: "We think the rule that gives legal
effect to spendthrift provisions as against contract creditors
should not be extended to claims for support or alimony."2
The Court pointed out that the question was an open
one in Maryland. The validity of spendthrift trusts in this
State was established in 1888 in Smith & Son v. Towers,
Garnishee,' where it was held, over the strong dissent of
Chief Judge Alvey, that the income from such a trust was
beyond the reach of creditors of the beneficiary by any
process at law or in equity. While the enforcement of
spendthrift provisions has become general practice it con-
stitutes a departure from the normal trusts rule which
recognizes that the beneficiary's interest in a trust is freely
alienable, either voluntarily or involuntarily.'
One earlier attempt was made to have the Court of
Appeals rule that this specially favored device-the spend-
thrift trust-should not be further favored to defeat the
claims of a wife for support. In the case of Bauernschmdit
v. Safe Deposit & Trust Company,' plaintiff had obtained
a divorce from her husband in California, and a decree
for separate maintenance pursuant to an agreement be-
tween the parties. Defendant allowed the payments to fall
in arrears, and plaintiff sued out a writ of non-resident
'Ibid., 296. The Court decided, however, that there was no occasion for
Impounding the fund with the Clerk of Court upon default of the defendant
to appear and subject himself to imprisonment for contempt, and that
the appellee was entitled to a judgment of condemnation, upon disclosure
of the amount of assets held by the trustee, according to the regular course
of procedure In attachment on judgments. The order was therefore affirmed
in part and reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
869 Md. 77, 14 A. 497, 9 Am. St. Rep. 398 (1888) ; see dissent, 15 A. 92
(1888). See also: Jackson Square Loan & Savings Association v. Bartlett,
95 Md. 661, 53 A. 426, 93 Am. St. Rep. 416 (1902); Medwedeff v. Fisher,
179 Md. 192, 17 A. 2d 141, 138 A. L. R. 1313 (1941) Petting v. Flanagan,
185 Md. 499, 45 A. 2d 355, 174 A. L. R. 301 (1946).
'See ScoTr, TRUSTS (1939), sec. 132, and secs. 142-148; RESTATEMEriT,
TRuSTS (1935) sec. 132, and secs. 142-148.
5176 Md. 351, 4 A. 2d 712 (1939), Note, May a Spendthrift Trust be
Reached for Alimony, or Support? (1940), 4 Md. L. Rev. 417.
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attachment against him in Baltimore City, garnisheeing
the Trust Company to recover said arrears out of the
income due defendant under two spendthrift trusts. Plain-
tiff argued that in California an award based on an agree-
ment was considered to be alimony, and that in that state
the income from a spendthrift trust could be reached by an
alimony claimant.' The Maryland Court, on the strength
of the Dickey' and Bushman' cases, refused to consider the
decree based on a separation agreement as alimony, and
held that whatever status might be accorded to such a
decree in California, it was not alimony in Maryland, and,
hence, that a wife's claim based upon an agreement stands
upon no higher footing than that of any other creditor. The
Court then disposed of the trust question by saying: "The
second contention, that the rule respecting the attachability
of spendthrift trusts should be relaxed when the claim is
for alimony, cannot be entertained here unless we overrule
the decisions in the Dickey and Bushman cases, supra,
which give to money decrees founded on agreements for
support the same dignity, force and status as other debts
of record. As we are not ready to overrule those decisions
there is no need to discuss the decisions elsewhere, of the
rights of the wife of a spendthrift cestui que trust." In the
casenote commenting upon the Bauernschmidt case, it
was pointed out that when the issue was faced: "It would be
better policy to fall in line with the sound view of public
welfare to the effect that a wife or child in a suit whose
real nature is one for support may reach the income from
a spendthrift trust.""
Throughout the country, this has been a much litigated
question, marked by a wide divergence of opinion among
the individual courts. Some jurisdictions have dealt with
the problem by resting the decision upon a consideration
of the intent of the settlor. 10 Where the settlor expressly
'This was apparently a misconception of the California law, which was
quite to the contrary; see San Diego Trust & Savings Bank v. Heustis,
121 Cal. App. 675, 10 P. 2d 158 (1.932) ; Canfield v. Security First National
Bank. 8 Cal. App. 2d 277, 48 P. 2d 133 (1935) ; Kelly v. Kelly, 11 Cal. App.
2d 356, 79 P. 2d 1059 (1938).
' 154 Md. 675, 141 A. 387, 58 A. L. R. 634 (1928).
' 157 Md. 166, 145 A. 488 (1929).
94 Md. L. Rev., op. cit. supra, n. 5, 423.
10 England v. England, 223 Ill. App. 549 (1922) ; Keller v. Keller, 284 Ill.
App. 198, 1 N. E. 2d 773 (1936), based on the mere absence of an express
provision to the contrary; In re Moorehead's Estate, 289 Pa. 542, 137 A.
802, 52 A. L. R. 1251 (1927) ; Thomas v. Thomas, 112 Pa. S. 578, 172 A. 36
(1934) ; Wetmore v. Wetmore, 149 N. Y. 52, 44 N. E. 169 (1896) ; Schwager
v. Schwager, 109 F. 2d 754 (C. C. A. 7th Cir. 1940), cf. Dillon v. Dillon,
244 Wisc. 122. 11 N. W. 2d 628 (1943).
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provides in the trust that the wife is to receive the benefits
thereof, there is no difficulty, since clearly she is a bene-
ficiary equally with the husband. But where the settlor
has failed to make express provision within the instrument,
treating the wife as an intended beneficiary would seem
to be less desirable as a justification for the result than
would be a direct recognition that public policy does not
permit her to be excluded, 1 as was basically the reasoning
of the instant case.
A growing number of the courts have thus resolved the
controversy, some reasoning that since alimony is not a
debt, but rather a social duty imposed upon the husband,
the standard provisions in the trust instrument exempting
the interest of the beneficiary from the claims of his credi-
tors will not apply to a wife suing on the basis of an ali-
mony decree. 2 Even in some of the above referred to de-
cisions allowing income from a spendthrift trust to be
reached by an alimony or support claimant by resorting
to the fiction of the settlor's implied intent, the broad pat-
tern of public policy has been emphasized, and it may be
regarded as implicit in them all. Thus in the leading case
of In re Moorehead's Estate, 3 the Pennsylvania Court
stated, arguendo, that: "Public policy is not so vague and
wavering a matter as not to be rightly invoked in a case of
this character.. ." And, in the later case of In re Stewart's
Estate4 that Court stated: "Since we have declared that
spendthrift trusts are against public policy in this State
as to claims of wives for maintenance, they are entitled to
recover against the beneficial interests of their husbands
as though no spendthrift clause was contained in the will
or deed creating them." The opposition to this view has
" GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS (1936) Sec. 334 states "it would appear
to be more satisfactory for the courts to recognize frankly that recovery by
the wife or child represents a limitation on the generality of the spendthrift
trust".
12 Stone v. Stone, 188 Ark. 622, 675 S. W. 2d 189 (1934); England v.
England, supra, n. 10; Tuttle v. Gunderson, 254 Ill. App. 552 (1929),
cert. den. 341 Ill. 36, 173 N. E. 2d 175 (1930) ; Clay v. Hamilton, 116 Ind.
App. 214, 63 N. E. 2d 207 (1945) ; Hollis v. Bryan, 166 Miss. 874, 143 So.
687 (1932) ; Cogswell v. Cogswell, 178 Ore. 417, 167 P. 2d 324 (1946);
Dillon v. Dillon, svpra, n. 10; and see Audubon v. Shufelt, 181 U. S. 575
(1901), stating as to the nature of alimony: "Permanent alimony Is re-
garded rather as a portion of the husband's estate to which the wife Is
equitably entitled, than strictly as a debt."
"Supra, n. 10.
"334 Pa. 356, 5 A. 2d 910, 914 (1939) ; cf. Lippincott v. Lippincott, 349
Pa. 510, 37 A. 2d 741 (1944), in which the Pennsylvania Court refused to
apply this to alimony arising under an a vinculo divorce, apparently con-
fining it to the claims of deserted or neglected wives; the present Penn-
sylvania statute, 20 P. S. 301.12 (The Wills Act of 1947) seems to be broader.
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been chiefly on grounds that the right of the donor to dis-
pose of his property as he sees fit is paramount to the
donee's obligation to pay alimony or support, and that,
hence, to allow the income to be so attached would enforce
the obligations of the husband against the settlor, thus in
effect rewriting his will and disposing of his property con-
trary to his wishes. 5 A number of jurisdictions have stated
in statute law this policy of according full protection to
alimony claims.'6
The Court of Appeals in the instant opinion, in holding
that the spendthrift beneficiary's income may be reached
by an alimony claimant (and the opinion extended this
to cover claims for support as well)' 7 said in part: "In
such situations the wife is a favored suitor, and her claim
is based upon the strongest grounds of public policy. The
fact that, as against a resident husband, an award may be
enforced by imprisonment for contempt, is no argument
against the exercise of a less drastic remedy in a proper
case. In the case at bar it is the only remedy available....
We rest our decision upon grounds of public policy, not
upon any interpretation of the instruments in question,
which are not broad enough to authorize payments by the
trustee for the benefit of a divorced wife.' 8
Leading text writers and the Restatement of Trusts
are in complete accord with this position.19 Professor Scott,
15 Erickson v. Erickson, 197 Minn. 71, 260 N. W. 161, 164 (1936),
rehearing den. 267 N. W. 426 (Minn. 1936) : "It is the intent of the donor,
not the character of the donee's obligation which controls the availability
and disposition of his gift"; Roorda v. Roorda, 230 Iowa 1103, 300 N. W.
294 (1941); Eaton v. Lovering, 81 N. H. 275, 125 A. 433, 35 A. L. R.
1034 (1924) ; DeRousse v. Williams, 181 Iowa 379, 164 N. W. 896 (1917) ;
Bucknam v. Bucknam, 294 Mass. 214, 200 N. E. 918, 104 A. L. R. 774 (1936).
See Note, Is Alinzony a Debt? (1941), 27 Va. L. R. 914.
18See, e.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. (1939) Sec. 570: "All restraints upon the
right of the cestui que trust to alienate or anticipate the income of any
trust estate in the form of a spendthrift trust, or otherwise, and all
attempts to withdraw said income of any trust estate from the claims of
creditors of the cestui que trust, whether said restraints be by will or
deed, now existing or in force, or, which may be hereafter executed in
this state, be and the same are hereby declared null and void and of no
effect, as against the claims of any wife, child or children, of said cestui
quo trust for support or maintenance, or, as against the claim of any said
wife for alimony". Howard v. Jennings, 146 F. 2d 332 (C. C. A. 8th 1944),
Aff'g., 56 F. Supp. 193 (E. D. Mo. 1944), applying statute to foreign decree
for divorce and alimony. La. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Dart 1939), Sec. 9850.28;
Okla. Stat. (1943 Supp.) Tit. 60, Sec. 175.25.
"Above circa, n. 2.
19 Emphasis supplied.
"I BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) sec. 223; GLENN, FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANcEs (Rev. Ed. 1940) Sec. 189a; Scorr, TRUSTS (1939) Sec. 157.1;
GRIswoLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS (2d ed. 1940) Sec. 339; RESTATEMENT,
TRUSTS (1935) Sec. 157.
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in his work on Trusts, which is quoted from at length by
the Court, has said that: "The claim of a wife and dependent
children to support is based upon the clearest grounds of
public policy. They are in quite a different position from
ordinary creditors who have voluntarily extended credit.
It would be shocking indeed to permit a husband to receive
and enjoy the whole of the income from a large trust fund
and to make no provision for his needy dependents." ' The
Restatement, also cited and followed by the Court, states:
"Section 157. Particular Classes of Claimants. Although a
trust is a spendthrift trust or a trust for support, the in-
terest of the beneficiary can be reached in satisfaction of
an enforceable claim against the beneficiary,
(a) by the wife or child of the beneficiary for support,
or by the wife for alimony;
(b) for necessary services rendered to the beneficiary
or necessary supplies furnished to him;
(c) for services rendered and materials furnished which
preserve or benefit the interest of the beneficiary."'"
Professor Scott has suggested that it is possible to take
an intermediate view, stating that: "It may be held that
the dependents of the beneficiary cannot be precluded from
reaching his interest under a spendthrift trust, but that
they can reach only so much of the income as under the
circumstances may appear reasonable to the court which
has control over the administration of the trust .... Under
.. . [this view] the beneficiary is not permitted to live
in luxury while his dependents starve. On the other
hand, they will not be permitted to live in comfort while
he starves."22 The Court of Appeals, however, found no
necessity for this analysis, saying that: "This view seems
to be based upon the proposition that if the wife is allowed
the full amount of her claim the beneficiary may be left
destitute. We think that danger is remote, because in Mary-
land at least, an alimony decree is always open to revision
in the light of changed circumstances or conditions. '"2 3
See, SCOTT, op. cit. 8upra, n. 19, p. 790.
'Loc. cit. 8upra, n. 19; see RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, Md. Annot. (1940)
Sec. 157, citing cases accord and contra to subparagraph "b" on their facts,
but which probably do not settle the question because of failure to face
the theory presented to and adopted by the Court of Appeals in the instant
decision.
"Loc. cit., supra, n. 19. See Bucknam v. Bucknam, 8upra, n. 13, appar-
ently the basis for this; but cf. Burrage v. Bucknam, 16 N. E. 2d 705 (Mass.
1939), later proceeding contra.
1 Supra, n. 1, 296, citing Knabe v. Knabe, 176 Md. 606, 616, 6 A. 2d
366, 124 A. L. R. 1317 (1939).
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The result of the decision in the instant case is to place
Maryland, under a strongly written opinion, squarely in
line with the growing number of jurisdictions which hold
that the income from spendthrift trusts may be reached
by the wife for alimony. And the language of the opinion,
as quoted above,24 relates to claims for support as well as
for alimony. This is sound because spendthrift trusts, which
required special favor of the law to be enforceable at all,25
should not have that favor extended to defeat the social
policy of the State that a husband must support his wife
and children. A logical extension of this approach would
recognize that the spendthrift interest may be reached for
other purposes when social policy so requires, as has been
accepted as the general rule by the American Law Institute
in the Restatement2" and by other leading authorities.2 7
24 Circa, n. 2.
Supra, circa, n. 4.0 Quoted, 8upra, circa, n. 21; cf., RESTATEMENT, TRUST, Md. Annot. (1940),
sub. par. 6. See Mercantile Trust Co. v. Hofferbert, 58 F. Supp. 701, 704
(1944), in which Judge Chesnut, after reviewing the Maryland authorities,
held that the interest of the beneficiary under a spendthrift trust was
subject to a claim for federal income taxes (relied on in the instant opinion).
" Supra, n. 19.
19491
